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Abstract 
Transaction costs, one often hears, are “the economic equivalent of friction in 
physical systems.”  Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in 
formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how 
the system actually does – let alone should – work.  Interestingly, however, the present-
day economics of organization also ignores friction.  That is, almost single-mindedly, the 
literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and 
(especially) transaction-specific assets.  The costs involved are certainly costs of running 
the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously “frictions.”  Stories about 
frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and 
expensive assets placed at risk.  But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of 
cost – what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs – actually have a 
secret life.  They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, 
the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and 
market.  These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle.   
I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping 
us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change 
over time. 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D23, L22 
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Anatomy of the mundane. 
In the preeminent book devoted (self-consciously) to transaction-cost economics, 
Oliver Williamson tells us this about what transaction costs are.  
Kenneth Arrow has defined transaction costs as the “costs of 
running the economic system” (1969, p. 48).  Such costs are to be 
distinguished from production costs, which is the cost category 
with which neoclassical analysis has been preoccupied.  
Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical 
systems (Williamson 1985, pp. 18-19).   
Williamson then quite properly chastises traditional neoclassical theory for 
basing its policy conclusions on the assumption that all costs are production 
costs.  Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating 
theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the 
system actually does – let alone should – work. 
Interestingly, however, Williamson himself also neglects friction.  That is, 
he immediately drops the characterization of transaction costs as frictions, and 
goes on to study transactions from a quite different perspective.  Transactions, he 
says, have three “critical dimensions”: uncertainty, frequency, and asset 
specificity (1979, p. 239).  But the “most critical dimension for describing 
transactions is asset specificity” (1985, p. 30).  The possibility of opportunism in 
the face of highly specific assets certainly does introduce a source of costs other 
than production costs as traditionally understood in price theory.  Such 
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opportunism may even be a cost of running the economic system in some sense.1  
But it is not obviously a friction.  The costs that opportunism introduce arise 
from incentive misalignment, and incentive misalignment is quite arguably the 
central preoccupation of the present-day economics of organization, at least as 
practiced within actual economics departments (Langlois and Foss 1999).  But 
most theorists of incentive misalignment find no reason to refer to the resulting 
costs as transaction costs, let alone as frictions. 
One reason for this odd detour is no doubt that, taken literally, friction 
isn’t a particularly sexy source of transaction costs.  As the term was originally 
used in monetary theory, a transaction cost occurred when, in effect, some 
amount of the good was used up in the transaction.  In Paul Samuelson’s (1954) 
famous iceberg model of transportation costs, a certain amount of the iceberg 
melts away as it is transported – or, we might add, as it waits around while being 
exchanged.  This sounds very much like friction.  Indeed, if we think of a 
transaction cost in this way, “in no significant way does it differ from a regular 
transportation cost” (Dahlman 1979, p. 144).   
Many have written about the history and meaning of the term transaction 
cost.2   One insightful treatment, that by Douglas Allen (2000), will serve as our 
                                                 
1  Already in 1979, Dahlman could write that the term transaction cost had “become a catch-all 
phrase for unspecified interferences with the price mechanism” (Dahlman 1979, p. 144).   
2  For a history of the concept of transaction costs, see, for example, Klaes (2000), which, 
unfortunately, does not offer much critical analysis of the changing (or perhaps widening) 
meaning of the term. 
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jumping-off point.  Allen argues that there are two distinct traditions using the 
term transaction cost, and accordingly two quite different meanings of the term.  
One is the property rights tradition, inspired by the work of Coase (1937, 1960), 
which (implicitly) defines transaction costs as “the costs of establishing and 
maintaining property rights” (Allen 2000, p. 898).  These costs can be fixed (and 
sometimes sunk) as well as variable.  They include costs not only of setting up 
but also of maintaining – and, importantly, of policing – the system of rights.  
They may be paid privately or through the government.  They include the costs 
of locks, police, and guard dogs, as well as any deadweight loss arising out of the 
attempt to protect or expropriate rights (Allen 1991, p. 3).  In a contractual 
setting, they can include monitoring costs, bonding costs (including the sunk 
costs of a hostage (Williamson 1985, chapter 7)), and any residual loss of having 
imperfectly protected one’s assets.3  This is clearly a broad set of costs, not all of 
which seem obviously entitled to the moniker “transaction costs.”  For his part, 
Allen is happy to identify the property rights approach with the entire field of 
the New Institutional Economics and with theorists ranging from Alchian and 
Demsetz to Klein and Williamson to Milgrom and Roberts. 
The second tradition Allen identifies is the neoclassical approach, in which 
transaction costs are “the costs resulting from the transfer of property rights” 
(Allen 2000, p. 901).  In this approach, which is the one that grew out of monetary 
                                                 
3  I am here generalizing (or at least adapting) the three categories of what Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) call agency costs. 
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economics (Hicks 1935), transaction costs really are frictions: they arise only 
when a title to property is exchanged in a market (and only in a market, not in a 
firm or a centrally planned economy).4   
An example – mine not Allen’s – may help clarify.  In the American 
Midwest before the coming of the railroad, as indeed throughout much of 
agricultural history, wheat was stored, shipped, and traded by the sack (Cronon 
1991).  Each sack of wheat was the product of a specific identifiable farmer, 
which meant that repeated trades could generate reputation effects that assured 
the quality of the grain in the market.  At the same time, however, this mode of 
storage meant large transaction costs in the neoclassical sense:  the transportation 
costs of shipping the sacks by wagon and river to St. Louis or Chicago; brokerage 
fees; insurance premia; the implicit costs of price volatility and poor information 
about market prices at destination; and the cost of the stevedores lugging bags 
from warehouse to barge to warehouse.5  Even the burlap bags themselves cost 
two to four cents apiece (Cronon 1991, p. 113).  Holding shipping route constant, 
most of these costs were arguably incurred on a per-sack basis as part of the 
                                                 
4  Lone among property rights theorists, Harold Demsetz (1988) cleaves to this definition of 
transaction costs, even though he is of course perfectly cognizant that there are costs of 
creating and defending property rights as well as costs of transferring resources in non-
market settings.   He would prefer to use the term governance cost to refer to the cost of 
transferring resources in either a market or a non-market setting. 
5  According to one (clearly exaggerated) contemporary account, a “10,000-bushel shipment of 
grain arriving in St. Louis might involve ‘the labor of probably two or three hundred 
Irishmen, negroes and mules for a couple of days’” (Cronon 1991, p. 112). 
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process of exchanging title to the wheat.  It was as if some – perhaps most – of 
the grain spilled out of the sack between farmer and miller.   
All of this changed with the coming of the railroad in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  It quickly became economical to store and ship wheat in bulk, using the 
newly invented mechanical grain elevator.  This reduced neoclassical transaction 
costs dramatically.6  But, as it necessitated mixing together the grain of many 
different farmers, it destroyed the system of quality control that had relied on 
reputational effects from repeated transactions with identifiable farmers.  To 
solve this problem, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange paid the costs of creating 
standardized categories for wheat and persuading farmers and buyers to adopt 
those standards (Cronon 1991).  In addition, they needed to pay the costs of 
inspecting the wheat for conformance to the standards, which they did by 
commissioning inspectors.   
The costs of this system are clearly the costs of establishing and 
maintaining property rights.  But are they neoclassical “frictions”?  The costs of 
establishing the standards clearly are not, since they are incurred once-and-for-
all as a fixed cost and cease thereafter to enter into marginal calculations.  But 
such fixed costs are of course related to frictional costs, in that they are substitutes 
for them: by paying the one-time cost of standards, I can avoid having to pay 
stevedores by the sack.  The value of substituting such a fixed cost for a per-
-  5- 
transaction cost clearly increases with the volume of transaction.  There is a more 
general point: costs of establishing and maintaining property rights are related to 
costs of exchanging property titles in that the principal (though perhaps not the 
only) reason for establishing rights to things is in order to trade those rights. 
But what about the costs of policing the standards?  That is less clear.  If 
inspection occurred whenever a bushel changed hands – and thus if inspection 
were a per-transaction cost – then inspection would be both a cost of maintaining 
a system of property rights and a neoclassical cost of exchanging titles to 
property.  In the event, this is very close to how the system actually worked in 
Chicago.  What merchants traded in the meeting rooms of the Exchange were 
literally paper titles – elevator receipts for specific lots.  By the 1860s, the Board 
had a city charter to appoint a “grain inspector of the city at large,” who in turn 
hired and trained a team of assistants.  For a standard fee, these inspectors would 
examine lots of grain and certify the grade of any elevator receipt traded on the 
floor (Cronon 1991, p. 119).  On the other hand, if inspection were not priced by 
the lot exchanged – if, for example, inspectors simply strolled into elevators 
periodically to make sure that everything was up to snuff – then the policing 
costs would actually be fixed costs even though they represent ongoing outlays: 
they would depend on time, but not on output (number of exchanges or volume 
of trade), and would thus be fixed not variable in the Econ 101 sense.  Much 
                                                                                                                                                 
6  A typical large elevator of the era could simultaneously empty twelve railroad cars and load 
two ships at the rate of 24,000 bushels per hour (Cronon 1991, p. 113). 
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policing of property rights is presumably of this latter type.  We pay police by 
the hour, not by the transaction or by the acre protected. 
So it appears we really have three categories of cost.  See Figure 1.  
Category (1) contains the fixed costs of establishing and maintaining a system of 
property rights.  These include not only technological standards like those for 
wheat but also legal standards – including the whole of property law.  It also 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Fixed costs Costs that are  a function of time 
 
Costs that are a function 
of number of exchanges 
or volume of trade 
 
 
Examples: 
 
Legal, organizational, 
and technological 
standards; hostages and 
bonds; locks, closed-
circuit TV.  
 
 
Examples: 
 
Salaries of police, 
supervisors, and other 
monitors; monthly 
protection money; 
maintenance of fixed 
investments. 
 
 
 
Examples: 
 
Brokerage fees, 
commissions; insurance 
premia; queuing at the 
bank, ATM fees; 
inspection and 
regulatory fees; per-
transaction bribes. 
 
 
Costs of property rights. 
 
Neoclassical T-costs. 
 
 
Mundane transaction costs 
 
 
Figure 1: types of (transaction) costs. 
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includes what we might think of as “organizational” standards such as the 
corporate law of asset partitioning (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000).  It would 
also include the fixed (and often sunk) costs arising from highly specific assets 
and the bonds and hostages sometimes used to offset those costs.  And, of 
course, it includes ordinary fixed capital like locks.  Category (2) contains costs 
that are paid periodically.  These depend on time, but not on number or volume 
of transactions.  This would include the salaries of police and of supervisors in 
firms.  It would also include bribes, taxes, red tape, and protection money when 
the costs of those are incurred over time not per transaction.  And it would 
include depreciation and maintenance of the fixed assets in category (1), even the 
“maintenance” of laws and standards.  Category (3) contains all the costs that 
come with number of transactions or volume transacted.  These include things 
like commissions, ATM fees, brokerage fees, insurance premia, inspection and 
regulatory fees, and sales taxes and transfer fees – including bribes when those 
are paid per transaction.  They would also include technological costs of 
transacting, like queuing at the bank or waiting around in port to be unloaded. 
Category (1) and (2) are all costs of establishing and maintaining property 
rights.  Category (3) are the neoclassical costs of exchanging titles to property: the 
costs of melting icebergs and leaking burlap bags.  In a sense, though, category 
(3) costs can also be costs of establishing and maintaining property rights: the 
price of setting up a system of ownership may often be that owners have to pay a 
per-transaction fee when they exchange title to what they own.  More generally, 
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the costs one pays in categories (2) and (3) depend on – flow from – the costs one 
pays in category (1).  As in the case of Midwestern wheat in the nineteenth 
century, the point of incurring costs of type (1) is to lower costs of type (2) and 
(3).  This is also true, of course, in the case of production costs, where one is often 
happy to pay high fixed costs in order to reduce variable costs, especially when 
one expects to amortize those fixed costs over a large volume of output.  
Moreover, production-cost choices can also drive category (2) and (3 ) transaction 
costs.  It was the coming of the railroad and the invention of the grain elevator 
that motivated the creation of standards and the system of inspection.  One 
needs to think about both production costs and transaction costs, as well as about 
their interaction – a point often forgotten in both theory (Langlois and Foss 1999) 
and economic history (Langlois 2004). 
In what follows I want to do two things.  First, I want to think a bit more 
about the relationship among production costs, fixed costs of category (1), and 
transaction costs of categories (2) and (3).  To do this, I will introduce something 
called the modularity theory of the firm.  Second, I want to rethink the 
importance of the more blue-collar costs of categories (2) and (3).  These two 
categories are what, more-or-less following Baldwin and Clark (2003), I will call 
mundane transaction costs.7  Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as 
                                                 
7  Baldwin and Clark (2003) attribute the term “mundane transaction costs” to Williamson 
(1985).  This phrasing is actually nowhere to be found in Williamson.  But what they 
apparently had in mind (Carliss Baldwin, private communication) is Williamson’s 
discussion of mundane versus peripheral activities (1985, pp. 105-106).  By mundane activities 
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intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed 
at risk.  But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of costs actually 
have a secret life.  They are at least as important as – and quite probably far more 
important than – the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the 
partition between firm and market.  These costs also have a secret life in another 
sense: they have a secret life cycle.   I will argue that these mundane transaction 
costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the 
boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time. 
The modularity theory of the firm. 
One important legacy of Coase, which Williamson embraces warmly, is the 
approach of comparative institutional analysis.  Originally growing more out of 
“The Problem of Social Cost” (Coase 1960) than “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase 
1937), comparative institutional analysis embodied a criticism of the Pigovian 
tradition of “market failure.”8  Under the doctrine of market failure, one is free to 
condemn real-world economic arrangements as inefficient, and free 
                                                                                                                                                 
Williamson means “core” activities that one would always “expect” to be vertically 
integrated: a classic example would be the successive stages of processing hot steel ingot.  By 
contrast, he says, peripheral activities – what we would think of as forward or backward 
integration – are more interesting candidates for transaction-cost analysis, since they could 
potentially take place “offsite.”  Williamson thinks that the explanation for mundane 
integration is the same as that for peripheral integration – asset specificity and opportunism.  
The point of Baldwin and Clark is that one has first to explain why some activities are 
“mundane” and some “peripheral” in the first place  As we will see, they look for that 
explanation in the underlying (modular) structure of the production process itself. 
8  This tradition is still alive and well, even if the abstract models used for comparison are 
different.  A preeminent modern practitioner is the recent Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz 
(2002). 
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simultaneously to call for government intervention (often of unspecified form), 
based upon a comparison of the observed arrangements with a theoretical ideal 
that, all too often, failed to take account of all costs and constraints.9  By contrast, 
comparative institutional analysis operates by comparing actual discrete 
institutional alternatives.  As Williamson describes it, this involves “assigning” 
transactions to alternative organizational or institutional forms and arguing 
about which of the alternatives minimizes the sum of production and transaction 
costs10 (Williamson 1985, p. 18).   
Comparative-institutional analysis represents a great advance over 
Pigovian welfare economics.  But our applause should not distract us from the 
ultimate limitations of the approach.  Where exactly do the alternatives come 
from?  More subtly: what exactly are these things called “transactions,” and 
where do they come from?   According to Williamson (1985,  p.1), a “transaction 
occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable 
interface.  One stage of activity terminates and another begins.”  But where do 
technologically separable interfaces come from?  Why do activities terminate and 
begin where they do?  Some recent literature, which we may lavishly call the 
modularity theory of the firm (Langlois 2002; Baldwin and Clark 2003), seeks to 
                                                 
9  See Demsetz (1969) for a scathing early exposition of this criticism. 
10  Williamson actually uses the term governance structure, since, again, he is primarily 
concerned with how institutional alternatives deal with (govern) problems like 
opportunism. 
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 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
a1 x x x x x x x 
a2 x x x x x x x 
a3 x x x x x x x 
a4 x x x x x x x 
a5 x x x x x x x 
a6 x x x x x x x 
a7 x x x x x x x 
 
2.1.  A non-decomposable system. 
 
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
a1 x x      
a2 x x      
a3   x x    
a4   x x    
a5     x x  
a6     x x  
a7       x 
 
2.2  A nearly decomposable system 
 
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
a1 x x x x x x x 
a2 x x x     
a3 x x x     
a4 x   x x   
a5 x   x x   
a6 x     x x 
a7 x     x x 
 
2.3.  A modular system with common 
interface.  
 
Figure 2. 
answer these questions in a way 
consistent with the method of 
comparative-institutional analysis.   
The approach from modularity 
tries to place the question of 
organizational and institutional choice 
within the roomier framework of a 
systems-design perspective.  In the 
end, an institutional structure is a 
complex “designed” structure akin to 
those familiar in engineering design or 
biological evolution.11  A system of 
social institutions reflects some 
elements of conscious human design; 
and it is certainly an evolutionary 
system.  But, as Hayek long insisted, it 
is actually a third thing: it is, in Adam 
Ferguson’s famous phrase, “the result 
of human action but not of human 
                                                 
11  I will henceforth take institution to comprehend organization, though I return specifically to 
the question of firms.  For my views on the relationship of organization and institution, see 
Langlois (1995). 
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design” (Hayek 1967), where the “not of human design” part is intended to mean 
not that humans never try to design institutions (or parts of them) but rather that 
the system as a whole does not spring entire from such efforts. 
Talk of complex systems may call up a vision of Jeff Goldblum, as the 
supercilious mathematician in Jurassic Park, lecturing on the inevitability of 
nonlinear effects and unintended consequences whenever humans conjure with 
complexity.  To the more sophisticated, it may bring to mind the Santa Fe 
Institute.  In fact, however, unpredictable nonlinear effects are by no means an 
inevitable outcome of complexity.  As writers like Herbert Simon (1962) and 
Christopher Alexander (1964) long ago argued, the designed systems we observe 
in the world are often precisely those that have found ways of evading the 
nonlinearities of complexity.  They have done so by adopting a structure that is 
modular or, to put it more Simon’s more precise term, decomposable.  All systems 
are “modular” in the sense that they comprise parts, subsystems of parts, and 
relations among parts and subsystems.  The real issues are (1) which parts are in 
which subsystems and (2) what are the relationships among the subsystems.  A 
decomposable system is one that assigns parts to subsystems (modules) so as to 
minimize the total number of interactions among the modules.  Complete 
decomposability is not an impossible ideal: all systems in which the modules 
have nothing whatever to do with one another are completely decomposable.  
But such  systems are also of little interest, since the modules never work 
together.  Of much greater interest are nearly decomposable systems.   Figure 2 
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represents this in  terms of a matrix of relationships.  If module ai interacts with 
module aj, then there is an X in the appropriate spot; otherwise not.  If the Xs are 
mostly near the diagonal, as in Figure 1, then most interaction is contained 
within or “near” the modules themselves, and there are few far-flung 
interactions of the sort that so animated Goldblum.  The butterfly flapping its 
wings in South America creates no typhoon in China. 
There are two tricks to near decomposability as a design strategy.  The 
first, for which there is no magic formula, is to figure out the best way to assign 
parts to modules.  The second is ensure coordination among the (nearly) 
decomposed modules.  In Figure 2.3, a1 is a special module whose function is to 
coordinate the other modules.  This module may itself be a firm – a “systems 
integrator” that communicates with all the other firms.12  In other cases, we can 
think of a1 as an abstract set of standards that govern the interactions among 
modules.  Either way, the modules need to interact only (mostly) with a1, not 
with each other.  Baldwin and Clark (1997) generalize the idea of standards, as 
                                                 
12  Stefano Brusoni and his coauthors (Brusoni 2005; Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt 2001) like to 
portray the widespread need for systems integrators in distributed production networks as 
somehow in conflict with the theory of modular systems or perhaps even the Smithian 
theory of the division of labor.  As Smith pointed out, however, the existence of systems 
integrators – agents “whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and 
who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most 
distant and dissimilar objects” (Smith 1976, I.i.9) – is itself a manifestation of the division of 
labor.  A firm specializes in being a systems integrator.  It may well be true that, in their 
enthusiasm for abstract standards, proponents of the theory of modular systems have not 
always made clear that the coordinative knowledge possessed by the coordinating module 
a1 can sometimes be contained within the capabilities of an organization as well as within an 
abstract institution.  I argue that the theory of dynamic transaction costs (introduced below) 
offers a way to think about when coordinative knowledge will tend to be contained within 
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we loosely use the term in ordinary language, into a tripartite set of what they 
call visible design rules.  These consist of the architecture – the overall assignment 
of parts to modules; the interfaces, which govern the connections among modules; 
and the standards proper, which are criteria to measure the compliance of the 
modules with the design rules.  Consider again the case of wheat at the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange.  The publicly agreed-upon categories of wheat are the 
architecture.  The criteria, enforced by inspectors, for determining the bin into 
which a particular farmer’s crop will fall are the standards proper.  What then is 
the interface?  It is the price system. 
The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members 
survey the whole field, but because their limited individual fields 
of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries 
the relevant information is communicated to all. … The most 
significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with 
which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to 
know in order to be able to take the right action.  In abbreviated 
form, by a kind of symbol, only the most essential information is 
passed on and passed on only to those concerned. It is more than a 
metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for 
registering change, or a system of telecommunications which 
enables individual producers to watch merely the movement of a 
few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few dials, 
in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may 
never know more than is reflected in the price movement. (Hayek 
1945, pp. 526-527). 
                                                                                                                                                 
the capabilities of organizations and when delegated to unselfconscious mechanisms like 
standards. 
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Because of the wheat market’s architecture and standards, the modules 
(individual farmers and wheat traders) need only (mostly) interact through 
prices.  Relative prices are in effect module a1.  
The modules themselves can operate in any fashion they choose.  They 
can have their own hidden design parameters.  Unlike the visible design rules, 
which must be commonly shared, the module’s own design parameters need not 
be communicated to others.  Indeed, as the field of object-oriented programming 
has taught us, these hidden design parameters generally must not be 
communicated to others.  This is the principle of encapsulation and information 
hiding.  To allow another module knowledge of and access to one’s inner 
workings is to invite those other modules to tinker – and thus to invite butterfly 
effects.   
There is a natural fit between the theory of modular (that is, nearly 
decomposable) systems and the theory of property rights discussed earlier 
(Langlois 2002).  Rights – what legal philosophers call negative rights – are all 
about exclusion.  They are about encapsulation and information hiding.  If rights 
are not defined properly, then what goes on in one module (one bundle of rights) 
can affect what goes on in another in ways that the interface (i. e., the legal 
system) doesn’t take into account in coordinating the system’s overall 
performance.  We call such effects externalities.  In the literature on law and 
economics, a well-designed system of property rights is one that minimizes the 
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losses from externalities (which is not, of course, necessarily the same thing as 
minimizing externalities).  The same is true in the theory of the firm as seen from 
a property rights perspective:  the boundaries between firm and market arise as a 
solution to the problem of minimizing the costs of externalities.13
Baldwin and Clark (2003) cast the matter in a congruent form that more 
explicitly accounts for production as well as transacting.  The process of 
production, they argue, is a system of tasks assigned to various actors, both 
human and mechanical.  The process requires the transfer of material, energy, 
and information among those actors.  The design problem is to minimize total 
costs by deciding which transfers will take place within modules and which will 
cross module boundaries.14  Unlike Williamson, but like the neoclassical 
transaction-cost tradition, Baldwin and Clark insist on calling transactions only 
those transfers that cross module boundaries – only those transfers that, in their 
terms,  are standardized, counted, and compensated.   
Transfers that cross boundaries incur frictional (and other mundane) 
transactions costs, since, among other things, it is costly to count, to value, and to 
                                                 
13  Demsetz (1964) suggested early on that vertical integration is one way to solve paradigmatic 
Coasean problems of conflicting land-use.  His example is the shopping mall, in which a 
single owner (of the mall) manages and internalizes the externalities that would otherwise 
be created by separate shops.  From this it is a small step to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 
which is really a story about how the rebundling and reassignment of property rights solves 
a free-rider-externality problem. 
14  Because they are writing form a product-design perspective, Baldwin and Clark tend to cast 
the design problem as one faced by a human designer or design team.  But the same logic 
applies if the system actually emerges from unselfconscious design processes in a manner 
akin to biological evolution. 
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collect compensation.  Typically, there are also (mostly fixed) costs of turning 
transfers into transactions by establishing standards and procedures for 
counting, valuing, and collecting compensation.  When it is costly, for whatever 
reason, for a transfer to become a transaction, the transfer is best left to take place 
within a module – within the boundaries of an organization – where it need not 
be standardized, counted, and compensated.  The overall design of the task-and-
transfer system, then, will typically be one in which the most-transaction-costly 
transfers take place within the boundaries of modules and only the least-
transaction-costly transfers actually become transactions (and only these actually 
incur transaction costs).  Keep in mind that, since the goal is to minimize the sum 
of production costs and all three kinds of transaction costs, the result may not be 
one that minimizes transaction costs, since one may well want to increase 
transaction costs (of one kind or another) if that will more than proportionally 
reduce production costs or other kinds of transaction costs.  As I have already 
hinted, however, there is arguably a general tendency in this design process for 
costs of category (1) – fixed costs of standards and the like – to substitute for 
mundane transaction costs (especially those of category (3)) as the extent of the 
market expands. 
The secret life. 
Before there was Williamson, of course, there was Coase.   As we saw, 
Williamson talks about transaction costs as frictions but then immediately treats 
-  18- 
them not as frictions but as costs of maintaining property rights (costs of 
governing transactions).  By contrast, Coase is (rightly) credited with having 
inspired the property-rights approach in which transaction costs are the costs of 
establishing and maintaining property rights.  Interestingly, however, Coase 
himself viewed transaction costs as neoclassical frictions. 
Coase didn’t originally use the term transaction costs, and he has never 
seemed comfortable with the word since (Klaes 2000, p. 569).  He talked instead 
of “the costs of using the price mechanism.”15  These seem to fall into the 
categories of either search costs or contracting costs.  “The most obvious cost of 
‘organising’ production through the price mechanism,” he says, “is that of 
discovering what the relevant prices are.”  These are search costs, very much in 
the vein later mined by George Stigler (1961).  Contracting costs are of two types, 
neither of which involves the kind of incentive misalignment that plagues 
contracting in the present-day economics of organization.  One kind of 
contracting cost seems to qualify as frictional, or at least mundane:  the tedious 
business of “concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which 
takes place on a market.”   Organizing within a firm, Coase thinks, is a way to 
reduce the friction:  “A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have 
to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating 
within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a 
                                                 
15  All quotations in this paragraph are from (Coase 1937, pp. 390-391). 
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direct result of the working of the price mechanism.  For this series of contracts is 
substituted one.”   
Ultimately, however, it is a different type of contracting cost that really 
attracts Coase’s attention.  Notice that the costs of searching and writing many 
contracts vanish if there is no change or uncertainty: I can search once then 
simply write a long-term contract of indefinite length with the contracting parties 
I find.  But in a world of uncertainty, Coase observes, such a contract would be 
too inflexible to deal with change and contingency. 
Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of 
the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less 
possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person 
purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected 
to do.  It may well be a matter of indifference to the person 
supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of 
action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or 
commodity.  But the purchaser will not know which of these 
several courses he will want the supplier to take.  Therefore, the 
service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the 
exact details being left until a later date.  All that is stated in the 
contract is the limits to what the persons supplying the commodity 
or service is expected to do.  The details of what the supplier is 
expected to do is not stated in the contract but is decided later by 
the purchaser.  When the direction of resources (within the limits of 
the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that 
relationship which I term a “firm ” may be obtained. (Coase 1937, 
pp. 391-392). 
The firm does indeed substitute a single contract for many individual contracts,  
but that substitution is qualitative as well as quantitative.  The single contract is 
not an output contract but an employment contract of the sort later spelled out 
by Herbert Simon:  the employee agrees to let the employer choose any action x 
-  20- 
from a set X of possible tasks in return for a specified wage16 (Simon 1951).  
Rather than paying by the piece for each document filed or phone call answered, 
an executive pays an hourly wage and then assigns the secretary tasks on a 
flexible basis.  The tasks thus take place within a “transaction-free zone” – the 
firm – and are not individually counted and compensated.  “Indeed, firms can be 
considered as social artifacts designed for the purpose of encapsulating complex 
transfers of material, energy and information”17 (Baldwin and Clark 2003, p. 25, 
emphasis original). 
In effect, task uncertainty creates a coordination cost that limits the extent 
of the market and thus the division of labor: for if “production runs” of typing 
and phone answering were long and predictable enough, one could easily pay 
for these services by the piece, thus making them transactions rather than 
transfers.  Perhaps we can generalize this idea.  In Adam Smith’s formulation, an 
increasing extent of the market permits a finer division of labor in part because, 
with larger expected output, it becomes worthwhile to pay the fixed costs of 
standardizing tasks and standardizing what gets transferred between tasks 
(Smith 1976; Leijonhufvud 1986).  Division of labor does not by itself tell us when 
transfers will become transactions, since it is clearly possible to subdivide tasks 
                                                 
16  As Coase’s disciple Steven Cheung put it, the emergence of the firm involves “the 
replacement of a product market by a factor market, resulting in a saving in transaction 
costs” (Cheung 1983, p. 3). 
17  Baldwin and Clark note that other forms like families, tribes, and clans are also social 
artifacts for encapsulating transfers, but these were never consciously designed for the 
purpose.  Perhaps we might add clubs as designed institutions of encapsulation.   
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even with in a transaction-free zone.  But Smith’s theorem – that the division of 
labor is limited by the extent of the market – does give us some clues about when 
transfers will be encapsulated and when they will  be turned into transactions.   
Notice the word “complex” in the sentence from Baldwin and Clark 
above.  Firms encapsulate “complex” transfers, whereas less-complex transfers 
are more likely to become transactions.  But the causality can work both ways. 
Transfers may be encapsulated because they are necessarily complex, involving, 
for example, transfers of rich and idiosyncratic information among actors. 
Alternatively, encapsulated transfers can be complex because they happen to be 
encapsulated and it simply doesn’t pay to simplify and standardize them.  
Consider the following three possibilities. 
1. Transfers are encapsulated because transportation costs and frictional 
transaction costs limit the extent of the market.  In 1776, meat, bread, 
and ale, as well as the tasks needed to produce them, were 
relatively standardized; nonetheless, transfers were encapsulated 
within the household of an isolated Highlands farmer because the 
extent of the market for butchery, baking, or brewing was too small 
to make it worthwhile for the farmer to specialize in any one of 
these tasks and transact with other people through the market.18  In 
                                                 
18  “In the lone houses and very small villages which are scattered about in so desert a country 
as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be butcher, baker and brewer for his own 
family” (Smith 1976, I.iii.2). 
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Glasgow and Edinburgh, people did specialize in these “peculiar 
trades”; but transportation costs prevented markets from extending 
into the Highlands. 
2. Transfers are encapsulated because coordination costs limit the extent of 
the market.  The extent of the market may be large, and tasks and 
transfers relatively standardized, but spatial and temporal 
uncertainty limit the effective extent of the market.  In the parable of 
the secretary, the tasks of typing, filing, and phone answering are 
relatively standardized and separable; yet the unpredictability of 
which task will be needed at which moment limits the effective 
extent of the market, even when tasks in the aggregate are heavily 
demanded.19  So the secretary is “encapsulated” as an employee 
whose transfers are not individually counted and compensated.   
3. Transfers are encapsulated because dynamic transaction costs limit the 
extent of the market.  The extent of the market may be (potentially) 
large, but something inherent in the nature of the tasks and 
transfers makes it prohibitive to standardize them and to create 
transactions.20  Here the ultimate culprit is economic change and 
                                                 
19  Becker and Murphy (1992) make a similar point that coordination costs limit the division of 
labor.  But they choose to see coordination costs as something separate from the extent of the 
market, whereas I choose to emphasize that coordination costs limit the division of labor 
precisely because they effectively reduce the extent of the market. 
20  Brusoni (2005) writes that “there are cognitive limits to the extent of division of labour: what 
kinds of problems firms solve, and how they solve them, set limits to the extent of division 
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technological innovation, especially when it is systemic in 
character.  During the era in which Henry Ford was developing the 
moving assembly line, his company transformed from an assembler 
to a highly vertically integrated organization (Langlois and 
Robertson 1989).  Even though the firm would have liked to have 
made use of outside suppliers, Ford and his team were systemically 
reinventing the way automobile parts were fabricated.  The process 
of innovation made it necessary to transfer rich information quickly 
among actors and indeed made it undesirable to standardize the 
task-and-transfer system until the innovation reached maturity.  As 
a result, it was costly for Ford to enlist outsiders through the 
interface of the market.  These costs of informing outsiders and 
persuading them to cooperate in production are what I call dynamic 
transaction costs (Langlois 1992). 
Now notice something interesting.  In all three cases, the costs that motivate 
encapsulating tasks and transfers within the boundaries of the firm are not only 
all mundane but arguably all frictional.  In the first case, it is literally 
                                                                                                                                                 
of labour, irrespective of the extent of the market.”  Again, however, I prefer to say that 
these cognitive limits – which are part of what lies behind the phenomenon of dynamic 
transaction costs – reduce the division of labor because they reduce the effective extent of the 
market below what it would be if cognitive ability were unbounded and free.  Notice that 
Brusoni’s argument is essentially the same as that of Becker and Murphy (1992); the 
principal difference is that the “coordination costs” of Becker and Murphy sound like 
mundane transaction costs of type 2, whereas those Brusoni discusses seem to be dynamic 
transaction costs. 
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transportation costs that matter.  In the second case, coordination costs are 
clearly frictional: each time I wanted to transact with an office worker through 
the market, I would have to pay a “coordination fee” involving not only the 
resource costs of  counting, pricing, and paying for each transaction but also the 
opportunity cost of  slower and less effective matching of task with moment in 
time.   Similarly in the third case:  the costs of informing and persuading 
potential trading partners would involve a coordination fee made up not only of 
resource outlays but also of the opportunity costs of not having the capabilities 
you need when you need them (Langlois 1992, p. 113).   
The secret life cycle. 
As we saw, when viewed from the perspective of design, the problem of 
explaining the boundaries of the firm is one of determining when transfers tend 
to remain unstandardized, uncounted, and uncompensated and when they tend 
to become transactions.21  When viewed from an evolutionary perspective, 
                                                 
21  In general, transfers tend to become transactions at “gateways” or “thin crossing points” 
between modules.  Baldwin and Clark (2003, pp. 17ff.) use the marvelous example of a 
smithy and a kitchen in pre-modern times.  Both units are engaged in complementary tasks 
that ultimately put food on the table:  the smithy makes cooking implements and the kitchen 
prepares the food; and both employ the division of labor.  At what point in this task-and-
transfer system would one most expect to see a transaction?  The natural place, of course, is 
at the handoff of finished implements between the smithy and the kitchen.  This is so not 
merely because the transfer is relatively standardized and easy enough to count and 
compensate at that point but also because the smithy and the kitchen form two naturally 
distinct subsystems of related tasks. Compare this with George Richardson’s (1972) 
suggestion that firms tend to take on board mostly activities that are related to one another 
in the sense that carrying out those activities requires similar knowledge or capabilities.  In 
Baldwin and Clark, it is the interrelatedness of the tasks rather than similar capabilities that 
determines the natural boundaries of modules.  But, as most students of capabilities would 
insist (see, notably, Nelson and Winter (1982), chapters 4 and 5), the knowledge that 
constitutes capabilities is often embedded in the routines and practices of the organization – 
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however, the problem of explaining the boundaries of the firm is also one of 
explaining how encapsulation boundaries and the location of transactions change 
over time.  One way to think about this latter problem, I suggest, is to examine 
the ways in which changes in the various types of mundane transaction costs 
affect encapsulation boundaries. 
Let’s start with transportation cost and the kind of leaky-grain-sack 
transaction costs that are analogous to transportation costs.  As these kinds of 
costs diminish, the extent of the market increases as local markets begin to 
integrate.  With a larger extent of the market, and in the absence of any other 
kinds of transaction costs, it starts to pay not only to subdivide tasks further but 
also to turn more transfers into transactions.22  Just as it is worth paying the fixed 
set-up costs of subdividing tasks (Smith), it is also worth paying the fixed set-up 
costs of standardizing transfers and creating a system to count and compensate 
them (Baldwin and Clark).  Specialization in tasks and vertical disintegration in 
organization go hand in hand.  The result would seem to be George Stigler’s 
famous conclusion that “vertical disintegration is the typical development in 
growing industries, vertical integration in declining industries” (Stigler 1951, p. 
189).  I have argued, however, that, phrased this way, Stigler’s conclusion isn’t 
quite right (Langlois 1992).  Stigler’s conclusion is valid if we are comparing two 
                                                                                                                                                 
that is, capabilities are actually imbedded in the tasks themselves.  In this sense, Richardson 
and Baldwin and Clark are making much the same point. 
22  Actually, as I’ll suggest in a minute, an increase in the extent of the market can sometimes 
lead to the integration of tasks rather than to further subdivision. 
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states of long-run equilibrium, one with a small extent of the market and one 
with a larger extent of the market: in the equilibrium with the larger extent of the 
market, we should observe finer vertical disintegration than in the equilibrium 
with a smaller extent of the market.  But this is not the same thing as saying that 
we should observe vertical disintegration in a “growing industry.”  Growth takes 
place in disequilibrium.23  And disequilibrium can lead to dynamic transaction 
costs, especially when the increase in the extent of the market calls for a systemic 
reorganization of the task-and-transfer system (Langlois 1992).  These dynamic 
transaction costs can lead to an even greater degree of vertical integration than 
existed before the extent of the market increased.24  To put it another way, 
reductions in mundane transaction costs of type 1 can sometimes lead to 
offsetting increases in mundane transaction costs of type 3. 
In the case of wheat in the American West of the mid-nineteenth century, 
the rapid decline in transportation costs attendant on the coming of the railroad 
led to systemic technological change and a major alteration in the task-and-
transfer system.  But it did not result in a major increase in the degree of vertical 
integration in the system, largely because the sectors upstream and downstream 
                                                 
23  There is of course a notion of “equilibrium growth.”  But what I mean by equilibrium is that 
the rate of change of the degree vertical integration is either zero or close to and 
asymptotically approaching zero.  Thus a change in the extent of the market will create a 
disequilibrium – a positive rate of change of the degree of vertical integration.  I mean by the 
short run the period in real time during which that rate remains positive and by the long run 
the period after which it is zero or close to and asymptotically approaching zero. 
24  Phrased in terms of a Gedanken regression, we might say that in explaining the degree of 
vertical integration, the sign of the extent of the market is negative, but the sign on the rate 
of change of the extent of the market can be positive. 
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from storage and transportation – farming and local distribution – were tied to a 
dispersed geography and because market-supporting institutions (the standards) 
emerged quickly.  But, as Alfred Chandler showed in The Visible Hand (1977), 
vertical integration was the rule in many other contemporary industries affected 
by the advent of the railroad, the telegraph, and improved inland water 
transportation.  From petroleum to meat packing to branded goods, the effect of 
lower transportation and frictional transaction costs was to raise the scale of 
production, since it began to pay to mass produce and ship rather than to 
produce locally at small scale.  Because these changes were systemic – involving 
major redefinitions of tasks and shifts of task boundaries – the necessary markets 
and market-supporting institutions could not be called into existence quickly, 
making it costly to organize many of the new transfers as transactions.  Dynamic 
transaction costs were high, and entrepreneurs needed to encapsulate much of 
the system within the boundaries of large vertically integrated concerns 
(Langlois 2003b).   
Thus the apparently anti-Smithian conclusion embodied in the title of 
Chandler’s book: although the extent of the market was expanding, even 
dramatically, large swaths of the division of labor were coordinated as 
encapsulated transfers rather than as the market transactions Smith seemed to 
imply.  Even when there were existing or potential “thin crossing points” 
between subsystems of tasks, these were regulated as uncounted and 
uncompensated transfers.  Seen from the right perspective, however, there is 
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actually nothing un-Smithian going on (Langlois 2003b).  A reduction in 
transaction costs of category 1 led to an increase in the potential extent of the 
market and a finer division of labor; but the effective extent of the market was 
small because of the systemic newness of the task-and-transfer network.   
As we saw, by allowing the manager authority to adapt flexibly, the 
Coasean firm is one way to reduce the costs of coordination.  Indeed, Chandler 
saw the problem in very much this way.  Because the increased potential extent 
of the market called for mass production, and mass production called for high-
fixed-cost machinery (more on which presently), it was crucial to keep the 
system humming in order to amortize those fixed costs over as high a volume as 
possible.  And this required managers to adapt flexibly in order to buffer 
uncertainty and keep the effective extent of the market high (Langlois 2003a, 
2003b).  But flexible managers are not the only way to buffer uncertainty.  
Alchian and Demsetz long ago challenged the idea that authority is the 
fundamental difference between the contracts that constitute a firm and those 
that constitute a market:  “Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to 
file that document,” they famously jibed, “is like my telling a grocer to sell me 
this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, 
p. 777).  And they were right: markets can in fact provide flexible responses to 
uncertainty, though they do so in a way different from a firm.  Markets and firms 
can be alternative ways of buffering uncertainty, alternative ways of adapting 
flexibly to variation in the environment (Langlois 2003b).  In the case of the firm, 
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the manager adapts to change by using authority to direct resources flexibly as 
states of the world reveal themselves in real time.  In the case of the Alchian-and-
Demsetz grocer, the customer can also act flexibly because the wide variety of 
alternative commodities available in the market permits him or her to exercise 
authority to adapt in real time.  I can choose tuna over bread as needed, just as I 
can choose typing over filing as needed, because multiple alternatives are 
available to me and I have the authority to choose on the spot without 
negotiation.   
As time passes and change slows, markets will become thicker, and both 
coordination costs and dynamic transaction costs will tend to diminish, all other 
things equal.  As this happens, it will begin to be worth paying the fixed costs of 
transaction-supporting institutions.  More and more transfers will become 
transactions.  And thick markets will increasingly come to supplant management 
as a mechanism for buffering uncertainty.  Arguably this is what has happened 
since the era of Chandler’s large vertically integrated firms.  I call the 
phenomenon the vanishing hand, and I have tried to explain it in a nuanced and 
historically attentive way (Langlois 2003b).  But the underlying theory is exactly 
this.  In the pre-Chandlerian era, transportation and frictional transaction costs 
were high, and lack of scale limited the extent to which transfers could be 
marketized.  In the Chandlerian era, transportation and frictional transaction 
costs fell dramatically, leading to a systemic reorganization of the task-and-
transfer system – but also to high dynamic transaction costs that made it 
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uneconomical initially to turn transfers into transactions.  In the post-
Chandlerian era, dynamic transaction costs diminished as markets thickened and 
market-supporting institutions emerged; this led to vertical disintegration as it 
began to pay to turn transfers into transactions. 
So Smith (and Stigler) are right.  In the long run, after dynamic transaction 
costs have had a chance to die down and to the extent that no other disturbing 
changes have emerged, increasing extent of the market leads to finer subdivision 
of tasks and to the transformation of internal transfers into transactions – to the 
division of labor and to vertical disintegration.  This is so because with a large 
and predictable extent of the market it becomes economical to pay the fixed set-
up costs of task specialization and the fixed set-up costs of standardizing 
transfers.  The two are in fact interrelated, as standardizing tasks and transfer by 
making operations increasingly routine is essential to the division of labor (Ames 
and Rosenberg 1965).  Making tasks increasingly standard and routine reduces 
production costs, as Smith noted, because it simplifies those tasks and speeds 
learning by human agents.  At the same time, however, standardized tasks both 
demand and facilitate standardized transfers between stations (Leijonhufvud 
1986). 
Let me now throw what may seem to be a monkey-wrench into the 
machinery.  And that monkey-wrench in the machinery is, well, machinery.  I 
have so far implied, with Smith and Stigler, that in the long run increasing extent 
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of the market always leads to the increasing transformation of encapsulated 
transfers into transactions.  And I continue to hold that, in the large, this is 
correct.  But there is in fact a tendency that would seem to work in the opposite 
direction.  As, with an increasing predictable extent of the market, tasks become 
increasingly routine and transfers increasingly standardized, it sometimes begins 
to pay not to subdivide tasks further but rather to integrate tasks within a 
machine (Ames and Rosenberg 1965).  Smith implicitly assumed that tools were 
already specialized to task and that the only response to increasing extent of the 
market is for labor to specialize to the same degree as tools.  Further increases in 
the extent of the market would continue this process, since it would reveal the 
possibilities for even more specialized tools to which humans would in turn 
specialize themselves.  But, as Ames and Rosenberg (1965) observe, tools can  also 
change their level of specialization.  As tasks become more and more routine and 
standardized, it increasingly pays not only to assign them to machine – which 
have comparative advantage over humans in routine tasks (Langlois 2003a) – but 
also to integrate several tasks into a single machine.25   
                                                 
25  Smith (1976, I.1.3) famously describes the manufacture of pins in his day, in which ten men, 
organized according to principles of the division of labor, could make about 48,000 pins a 
day, or almost 5,000 per person per day.  By Marx’s era, making pins was already the 
business of machines, and a single machine could crank out 145,000 a day.  But this increase 
in productivity came not because of a finer division of labor but because the pin-making 
machinery integrated many of the previously subdivided human tasks and undertook them 
with far greater speed and precision than humans could have mustered.  In Marx’s time, one 
woman or girl could supervise four machines, which means almost 600,000 per person per 
day (Marx 1961, Volume 1, Part IV, Chapter XV, Section 8, p 460).  As of 1980, one person 
could supervise 24 machines, each making 500 pins a minute, or about 6 million pins per 
person per day (Patten 1980).   
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As we saw in the case of grain elevators, the supersession of subdivided 
tasks by machines often involves a dramatic redesign of the task-and-transfer 
network.  A mechanical grain elevator is not just a faster and more efficient 
system of stevedores and conventional warehouses; it is something 
fundamentally different.  Similarly, electromechanical (and later digital) 
telephone switches did not speed up telephone calls by subdividing the labor of 
human operators more finely or speeding up the way calls are connected on a 
switchboard; rather, they operated by internalizing transfers within a machine, 
which required users to master a new interface (a rotary dial and system of 
phone numbers instead of a nice chat with Mabel).  This also changed the 
relationship of the worker to the machine, as the worker became a maintainer, 
designer, and (later) programmer rather than an “operator.”26  To put it another 
way, mechanization increases labor productivity not by reducing the number of 
workers performing the existing set of tasks but rather by crowding machines 
into the more routine tasks and crowding humans into tasks for which human 
cognition has comparative advantage (Langlois 2003a).  In many cases, the role of 
the human worker is that of Chandler’s manager in the small, namely, to buffer 
uncertainty: to keep the machine humming by tending it, feeding it, and 
maintaining it.   
                                                 
26  As in Smith, the worker has indeed specialized to the machine.  But the machine is less 
specialized than the Smithian tools it replaced, since it takes on several previously distinct 
operations (Ames and Rosenberg 1965). 
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That task integration into machines is also a consequence of the growth of 
the extent of the market does not so much contradict Smith as show how his 
account fits within the roomier accommodations of the modularity theory 
outlined above.  The boundaries of modules are set by the “natural” grouping of 
tasks, and what is “natural” is driven by the effective extent of the market, that 
is, the size of production runs conditioned not only on potential demand but also 
on uncertainty and environmental variation.  When the effective extent of the 
market is small, humans are unspecialized but tools are (relatively) more 
specialized.27  As effective market size expands, tools become more specialized, 
but at the same time humans become increasingly specialized to tools.  This 
process creates (in equilibrium) an increasing number of “technologically 
separable interfaces” along which transactions can flow.  As the effective market 
expands still further, this process is supplemented by the possibility of 
integrating certain of the most standardized and predictable tasks into machines.  
This latter process has the effect of turning transactions back into transfers (even 
in equilibrium).    
Does this mean that, as the effective extent of the market continues to 
grow, all tasks will be integrated into machines?  The key word here is 
“effective.”  As Schumpeter (1950, p. 82) reminds us, capitalism “is by nature a 
form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be 
                                                 
27  Tools are typically more specialized than humans at low levels of market extent simply 
because it is relative cheap to make specialized tools.  Even the most primitive hunter-
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stationary.”  We can expect buffets of change to move the system (and especially 
parts of the system) back and forth, and certainly to keep us out of the realm of 
science fiction.  Moreover, even as machines become more capable, it will still be 
economical to assign to humans those tasks in which humans have cognitive 
comparative advantage (Langlois 2003a).  And, since humans are in a sense 
inherently technologically separable from one another, we should expect to see 
lots of vertical disintegration – perhaps especially in those areas of most interest 
to us – even in a science-fiction world in which machines take over most routine 
activities.   
Furthermore, there is one sense in which mechanization actually increases 
the possibility of transactions across technologically separable interfaces.  The 
integration of tasks into machines depends not only on the potential extent of 
output but also on the predictability of that output.  “Predictability” here need 
mean only statistical predictability, not certainty.  Thus machines can sometimes 
take over operations even in a world of type 2 mundane transaction costs.  This 
has been true at least since the Jacquard loom, but the process has of course 
accelerated since the advent of cheap digital computing.  When you feed your 
card into an ATM or surf to the Dell website, a machine not a human secretary 
confronts you with a menu of standardized choices over which you (the Coasean 
“buyer”) can exercise authority flexibly.  Here the combination of a standardized 
                                                                                                                                                 
gatherer societies possessed an amazing array of specialized implements. 
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architecture of choice and speedy, precise computers means that individual 
transactions can be counted and compensated.  Of course, even digital computers 
are of little use in coping with dynamic transaction costs, which involve the 
inherently non-standard.  
The sacred and the profane. 
The modularity theory of the firm focuses on the way in which tasks and 
knowledge are grouped together in the production system.  By contrast, the 
theory of the firm in mainstream economics of organization – in which for 
present purposes I would include even Williamson – takes task boundaries 
(technologically separable interfaces) for granted and focuses, often single-
mindedly, on the issue of asset ownership.  In many of these theories, indeed, it 
is the ownership of non-human assets that defines the firm and sets its 
boundaries (Hart 1989).  I am far from denying that issues of highly specific 
assets are never part of the explanation.  For example, the dangers of putting 
specialized assets at risk may have been in the minds of some suppliers whom 
Chandlerian entrepreneurs found costly to persuade, and such considerations 
may thus have formed part of the dynamic transaction costs involved.28  But, as I 
would tell the story of industrial dynamics over the last century and a half, 
                                                 
28  History suggests, however, that, more often than not, it was not threats of opportunism that 
led to internalization but rather the opposite:  suppliers – when these could even be found – 
more often refused to deal because they didn’t have the necessary capabilities or because 
they actually considered the entrepreneur’s scheme absurd (Silver 1984; Langlois 1992, 
2004).  (These latter may be two ways of saying the same thing.)   
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opportunism arising out of asset ownership plays at best a bit part (Langlois 
2004).   
The perspective from modularity I advocate here has the benefit of 
returning our focus to the process of organizational change.  It also helps to 
connect the economics of organization to the grand theoretical landscapes of 
Smith and Coase.   The transaction costs involved may be mundane.  But it is 
well to remember that the older meaning of that term – still the first meaning in 
most dictionaries – is not “ordinary and commonplace” but “worldly.”  After all, 
like Smith and Coase, we are worldly philosophers. 
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